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GAME OVER FOR REGULATING VIOLENT 
VIDEO GAMES? THE EFFECT OF BROWN V. 
ENTERTAINMENT MERCHANTS ASS’N ON 
FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
Garrett Mathew-James Mott* 
As early as 1976, video games started to incorporate aspects of 
violence, such as striking enemies with a vehicle or using explosives to 
destroy a structure. Still, initially, courts were reluctant to assign the 
same constitutional protections to video games that they had granted to 
other protected media like motion pictures and written and musical 
works. But as technology progressed, courts, too, matured, becoming 
more open to the notion that video games should be a form of protected 
expression. Yet, some courts lost sight of the First Amendment’s vision 
and reconsidered their earlier decisions in which they upheld the 
constitutionality of video game expression. This prompted the U.S. 
Supreme Court, in the first case that dealt with the First Amendment’s 
protection of video games, to remedy nearly four decades of confusion 
and unify the law in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n. After the 
Court’s decision in Brown, it is safe to assume that, at society’s current 
level of technological progress, courts are likely to hold that children’s 
use of video games is expressive conduct that the First Amendment 
protects. But if technology becomes “too advanced” and mechanics 
such as virtual reality, three-dimensional space, and infrared movement 
simulators become the technological norm, the Court may have to 
reexamine its reasoning in Brown before too long. 
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“Prose is an art form, movies and acting in general are art 
forms, so is music, painting, graphics, sculpture, and so on. 
Some might even consider classic games like chess to be an 
art form. Video games use elements of all of these to create 
something new. Why wouldn’t video games be an art 
form?” 
—Sam Lake, Max Payne writer
1
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On June 27, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,
2
 in which it addressed the extent to 
which the First Amendment protects violent video games. While 
news coverage surrounding controversial violent video games has 
recently increased, the debate is decades old.
3
 As early as 1976, with 
the advent of Death Race—a coin-operated video-arcade game that 
was inspired by the cult film Death Race 2000
4
—video games 
incorporated aspects of violence into the gameplay mechanic—a set 
of defined rules or objectives that are intended to produce an 
enjoyable game-playing experience
5
—such as striking enemies with 
a vehicle or using explosives to destroy a structure.
6
 In Death Race, 
players controlled an on-screen vehicle with a steering wheel and 
accelerator pedal, and the objective was to crush creatures who were 
fleeing the vehicle.
7
 When they were struck, the creatures screamed 
 
 1. BOYS & GIRLS CLUBS OF AM., GAMETECH PROGRAM GUIDE 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.myclubmylife.com/Arts_Tech/Pages/gametech_program-guide.pdf; see Keith Stuart, 
Alan Wake Writer Sam Lake on the Creative Process: Part One, THE GUARDIAN (May 4, 2010, 
2:30 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/gamesblog/2010/apr/30/alan-wake-remedy-
sam-lake. 
 2. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 3. Shankar Vedantam, It’s a Duel: How Do Violent Video Games Affect Kids?, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (July 7, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/07/07/137660609/its-a-duel-how-do-violent-
video-games-affect-kids; see infra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. 
 4. See April MacIntyre, Roger Corman’s Cult Classics: Sneak Peek of New DVD 
Collection, MONSTERS & CRITICS (Apr. 30 2010, 2:58 AM), http://www.monstersandcritics.com/ 
dvd/news/article_1552138.php/Roger-Corman-s-Cult-Classics-Sneak-Peek-of-new-DVD-
collection. 
 5. CARLO FABRICATORE, GAMEPLAY AND GAME MECHANICS DESIGN: A KEY TO 
QUALITY IN VIDEOGAMES 7 (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/17/ 
39414829.pdf.  
 6. DEATH RACE (Exidy 1976). 
 7. Death Race, THE INT’L ARCADE MUSEUM, http://www.arcade-museum.com/game_ 
detail.php?game_id=7541 (last visited Feb. 25, 2012). 
  
Winter 2012]     BROWN V. ENTERTAINMENT MERCHANTS 635 
 
and vanished; in their places appeared two-dimensional tombstones, 
which players had to avoid.
8
 While the visual effects were blocky 
and primitive,
9
 Death Race set off a media firestorm.
10
 The National 
Safety Council called the game “sick” and “morbid,” and 60 Minutes 
evaluated the game’s psychological impact on children.
11
 
With the proliferation of read-only memory (ROM) cartridge 
systems (in the 1970s), 32-bit microchips (in the 1980s), and liquid 
crystal displays (in the 1990s), representations of violence in video 
games became increasingly realistic.
12
 Current video games have 
started to mimic human expression through artificial intelligence.
13
 
Actuality has become so intertwined with fantasy that some users 
have described the violent video game experience as “some of the 
most exciting, angry and satisfying action you’ll ever have.”
14
 
Academic studies have attempted to causally connect violent video 
games and the rate of violence associated with players.
15
 
Therefore, legislators have sought to impose regulatory controls 
on the sale of violent video games. Illinois, Louisiana, and Michigan 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. For a more quantitative illustration, a standard arcade game operates with a central 
processing unit (CPU) clock speed of three megahertz. The PlayStation 3, a seventh-generation 
video game console, operates at more than one-thousand times the CPU clock speed of an arcade 
game, at 3.2 gigahertz. See Sony’s Technology Highlights: Cell High-Performance Processor, 
SONY GLOBAL, http://www.sony.net/SonyInfo/technology/technology/theme/cell_01.html (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2012). 
 10. Chris Kohler, How Protests Against Games Cause Them to Sell More Copies, WIRED 
(Oct. 30, 2007, 3:40 PM), http://www.wired.com/gamelife/2007/10/how-protests-ag/. 
 11. Brian Deuel, DEATH RACE—A MORBID TALE: A RECOLLECTION OF STORIES FROM 
GAMING’S PAST, http://atari.vg-network.com/arc101_1.html (last visited July 25, 2011). 
 12. HOW IT WORKS: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 952 (Marshall Cavendish ed., 3d ed. 
2003); Mingxia Gu, The History of Liquid Crystal Display (LCD), KENT STATE UNIV., 
http://www.personal.kent.edu/~mgu/LCD/lcd_history.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2012); History of 
Microprocessors, COMPUTER NOSTALGIA, http://www.computernostalgia.net/articles/Historyof 
Microprocessors.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2012). 
 13. See Julian M. Bucknall, How Artificial Intelligence Mimics the Human Brain, 
TECHRADAR (Dec. 27, 2009), http://www.techradar.com/news/world-of-tech/how-artificial-
intelligence-mimics-the-human-brain-657976. 
 14. Tom Ivan, Crysis 2 Review, COMPUTERANDVIDEOGAMES.COM, http://www.computer 
andvideogames.com/292287/crysis-2-review-9/10-in-oxm/ (last visited July 25, 2011). 
 15. Craig A. Anderson & Nicholas L. Carnagey, Causal Effects of Violent Sports Video 
Games on Aggression: Is It Competitiveness or Violent Content? 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 731 (2009). In 2009, eighteen-year-old Devin Moore, apparently influenced by Grand 
Theft Auto, wrestled away a police officer’s firearm; shot him, his partner, and the emergency 
dispatcher in the head; and drove away in a stolen police cruiser. Rebecca Leung, Can a Video 
Game Lead to Murder?, CBSNEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 7:33 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
stories/2005/03/04/60minutes/main678261.shtml. 
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have enacted laws that were intended to prohibit minors from 
obtaining violent video games; however, courts ultimately 
invalidated the laws, holding that the laws imposed unconstitutional 
restraints on free speech.
16
 Brown arose from the California 
legislature’s attempt to draft legislation that it believed would 
withstand judicial scrutiny.
17
 The legislature was wrong. 
This Comment chronicles the major court cases that involved 
the rejection and the eventual acceptance of video games as a form of 
expressive conduct before it turns an analytical eye toward the 
Court’s decision in Brown, its first major foray into the world of 
video games. Part II provides an overview of the cases that preceded 
Brown in which courts typically aligned themselves with 
municipalities and reasoned that video games were nothing more 
than “technologically advanced pinball machines.”
18
 But Part II 
continues to show that, as technology progressed, the courts became 
more open to the proposition that video games are a form of 
protected expression.
19
 Thus, Part III details the Court’s decision in 
Brown, and Part IV predicts the impact that the case will have on 
future litigation in this context. 
II.  FIRST AMENDMENT  
JURISPRUDENCE ON VIDEO  
GAMES BEFORE BROWN 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”
20
 Before Brown, Courts infrequently encountered laws 
that regulated violent video games, and their decisions differed 
substantially.
21
 This inconsistency was due in part to the Supreme 
 
 16. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12A-15 (2005), invalidated by Entm’t Software Ass’n v. 
Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Ill. 2005); LA. REV. STAT. § 14:91.14 (2006), 
invalidated by Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823 (M.D. La. 2006); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 722.671, invalidated by Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 
646, 655–56 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
 17. Doug Mataconis, Supreme Court: Government Cannot Ban Violent Video Games for 
Children, OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY (June 27, 2011), http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/supreme-
court-government-cannot-ban-violent-video-games-for-children/. 
 18. Marshfield Family Skateland, Inc. v. Town of Marshfield, 450 N.E.2d 605, 610 (Mass. 
1983). 
 19. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 20. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 21. Compare Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 576–77 (holding that “[c]hildren have First Amendment 
rights” to play video games), and Sanders v. Acclaim Entm’t, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1279 
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Court’s silence on the subject.
22
 In the 1980s and 1990s, courts 
consistently refused to apply First Amendment protection to video 
games.
23
 Following Judge Posner’s opinion in American Amusement 
Machine Ass’n v. Kendrick
24
 and the 2002 decision Wilson v. 
Midway Games, Inc.,
25
 courts began protecting video games because 
of their communicative and expressive elements.
26
 This ultimately 
led to Brown. 
A.  First Generation Video Games (1980s):  
A “Far Cry” from Protected Expression 
In the 1980s, courts first encountered cases that dealt with 
regulations on video games that were different from regulations on 
other media.
27
 Those foundational cases, including America’s Best 
Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York,
28
 concluded that early 
video games were incapable of expression and thus not protected by 
the First Amendment.
29
 While those cases permitted regulations on 
public video arcades
30
 because of their size, their hours of operation, 
or the nature of their clientele, the underlying analysis was clear: 
video games’ lack of sophisticated aural, visual, or kinesthetic 
experiences were barriers to First Amendment protection. One 
example of a video game that apparently lacked the expressive 
conduct that the courts required was the iconic yet rudimentary video 
 
(D. Colo. 2002) (holding that video games are categorically protected by the First Amendment, 
eschewing the standard in Wilson), with Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 
181 (D. Conn. 2002) (holding that whether video games are protected under the First Amendment 
should be determined by case-by-case analysis), and Am.’s Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City 
of New York, 536 F. Supp. 170, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that video games “cannot be fairly 
characterized as a form of speech protected by the First Amendment”). 
 22. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 958 n.11 (9th Cir. 
2009) (remarking that the “Supreme Court has not specifically commented on whether video 
games contain expressive content protected under the First Amendment”). 
 23. See, e.g., Showplace, 536 F. Supp. 170; Marshfield, 450 N.E.2d 605. 
 24. 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 25. 198 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D. Conn. 2002). 
 26. See Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 577; Wilson, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 180–81. 
 27. See Malden Amusement Co. v. City of Malden, 582 F. Supp. 297, 299 (D. Mass. 1983); 
Showplace, 536 F. Supp. at 174; City of Warren v. Walker, 354 N.W.2d 312, 317 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1984); City of St. Louis v. Kiely, 652 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). 
 28. 536 F. Supp. 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 29. Thomas Henry Rousse, Electronic Games and the First Amendment: Free Speech 
Protection for New Media in the 21st Century, 4 NW. INTERDISC. L. REV. 173, 211 (2011). 
 30. The general distinction between “arcades” and video games became important later in 
Brown because of the private home setting in which players now play video games. 
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game PONG.
31
 In that game, the player used a joystick to maneuver 
a stick to hit a small circle across a two-dimensional screen.
32
 
In 1982, the Showplace court held that, in a case where the 
operator of an arcade establishment violated a city ordinance, for 
entertainment to be accorded First Amendment protection, the 
entertainment must contain an element of information or a 
communicated idea.
33
 Thus, the court determined that while motion 
pictures communicated a range of ideas by affecting viewers’ 
attitudes and behavior, video games were mere entertainment.
34
 
One year later, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in 
Caswell v. Licensing Commission,
35
 continued to apply the precedent 
in Showplace, holding that, where a prospective proprietor was 
prevented from building a coin-operated arcade, “any 
communication or expression of ideas that occurs during the playing 
of a video game is purely inconsequential” and video games thus did 
not deserve First Amendment protection.
36
 
Yet there was hope that courts would soon protect video games 
as expressive speech.
37
 The court in Marshfield Family Skateland, 
Inc. v. Town of Marshfield,
38
 which followed Showplace and denied 
First Amendment protection to one game, stated in dicta: “We 
recognize that in the future video games which contain sufficient 
communicative and expressive elements may be created.”
39
 Still, for 
 
 31. PONG (Atari 1972). 
 32. PONG, THE INT’L ARCADE MUSEUM, http://www.arcade-museum.com/game_detail.php 
?game_id=9074 (last visited Feb. 25, 2012). 
 33. Showplace, 536 F. Supp. at 173–74 (citing Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 
557–58 (1975) (holding that a prohibition on the staging of an allegedly obscene musical was an 
improper prior restraint)) (“[A] video game, like a pinball game, a game of chess, or a game of 
baseball, is pure entertainment with no informational element.”). 
 34. Two other cases from Massachusetts confronted the same issues that were posed in 
Showplace: Caswell v. Licensing Commission for Brockton, 444 N.E.2d 922 (Mass. 1983), and 
Marshfield Family Skateland, Inc. v. Town of Marshfield, 450 N.E.2d 605 (Mass. 1983). The 
courts in those two cases concluded that the operators of arcade entertainment centers failed to 
demonstrate that video games “import sufficient communicative, expressive, or informative 
elements to constitute expression protected under the First Amendment.” Caswell, 444 N.E.2d at 
926–27. Video games were simply “technologically advanced pinball machines.” Marshfield, 450 
N.E.2d at 610. 
 35. 444 N.E.2d 922 (Mass. 1983). 
 36. Id. at 927. 
 37. See Marshfield, 450 N.E.2d at 609–10. 
 38. 450 N.E.2d 605 (Mass. 1983). 
 39. Id. at 609–10. 
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nearly a decade, courts remained convinced that video games did not 
feature expressive conduct that was sufficient to entitle them to First 
Amendment protection. 
B.  The “Half-Life” Period (1990s) 
The 1990s included substantial innovation in video game 
platform design, graphics, and gameplay mechanics, when the 
industry designed its most prolific, profitable, and playful genres, 
including first-person shooter and real-time strategy games.
40
 At the 
same time, an evolution emerged in video game jurisprudence and in 
video games generally.
41
 The technological revolution began to chip 
away at the court rulings of the 1980s. 
In 1991, the Seventh Circuit in Rothner v. City of Chicago,
42
 
after “confess[ing] an inability to comprehend fully the video game 
of the 1990s,”
43
 held that an ordinance that prevented minors from 
playing video games on school days was a legitimate time, place, and 
manner restriction.
44
 The court did, however, assume for the sake of 
argument that video games were in fact protected by the First 
Amendment.
45
 Thus, the dicta in Marshfield materialized in Rothner, 
 
 40. Edwin Evans-Thirlwell, Feature: The History of First-Person Shooters, VIDEO GAMES 
DAILY (Oct. 26, 2009), http://videogamesdaily.com/features/200910/feature-the-history-of-first-
person-shooters/; TDA, The History of Real Time Strategy, Part 1: The Past Is Prologue, 
GAMEREPLAYS.ORG (May 9, 2008, 6:38 AM), http://www.gamereplays.org/portals.php?show= 
page&name=the_history_of_real_time_strategy_pt1&st=1. The first-person shooter refers to a 
genre of video games that are played from the point of view of the character and that generally 
feature the use of weapons like firearms to defeat enemies. Jay Gamon, Geek Trivia: First Shots 
Fired, TECHREPUBLIC (May 24, 2005, 7:00 AM), http://www.techrepublic.com/article/geek-
trivia-first-shots-fired/5710539. On the other hand, the real-time strategy game is characterized by 
resource accumulation and base building, and its primary mode of play is in real time (in contrast 
to turn-based play). See Dan Adams, The State of the RTS, IGN (Apr. 7, 2006), http://pc.ign.com/ 
articles/700/700747p1.html. 
 41. E.g., HEROES OF MIGHT AND MAGIC (3DO 1995) (requiring awareness of enemy 
forces); SIMCITY (Maxis 1989) (requiring mathematical computation to build cities). Compare 
Rothner v. City of Chicago, 929 F.2d 297, 303 (7th Cir. 1991) (assuming, but not deciding, that 
video games implicate the First Amendment), with Am.’s Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City 
of New York, 536 F. Supp. 170, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (reasoning that video games do not 
implicate the First Amendment). 
 42. 929 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 43. Id. at 303. 
 44. Id. at 303–04. 
 45. Id. 
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which became the first decision that hinted at the possibility of 
extending First Amendment protection to video games.
46
 
C.  “Counter-Strike” by the 
 Seventh Circuit (Early 2000s) 
Another decade passed before courts finally granted video 
games constitutional protection.
47
 During that time, the industry 
created some of its most recognizable products,
48
 many of which 
featured modifications and customizable content that allowed players 
to creatively express their own personalities through the games.
49
 
In 2001, the Seventh Circuit revisited its decision in Rothner in 
Kendrick, where an Indianapolis ordinance limited minors’ access to 
violent video games.
50
 Judge Posner analogized violent video games 
to violent literature such as Dracula, or the novels of Edgar Allen 
Poe, which children are often required to read, and found the 
ordinance unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment.
51
  
Yet, Judge Posner—in a similar manner to Justice Alito’s 
warning in Brown
52
—cautioned the victorious video game 
manufacturers
53
 that technological advances alone do not confer First 
Amendment protection; it is the aggregation of technological 
progress and the storytelling mechanism of a video game that entitles 
it to First Amendment protection.
54
 
 
 46. See Neil G. Hood, Note, The First Amendment and New Media: Video Games as 
Protected Speech and the Implications for the Right of Publicity, 52 B.C. L. REV. 617, 630 
(2011). 
 47. See, e.g., Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 48. Chris Kohler, Review: Ocarina of Time 3D Reminds Us Why Zelda Is Best Game Ever, 
WIRED (June 17, 2011, 1:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/gamelife/2011/06/ocarina-of-time-3d-
review/. 
 49. See, e.g., THE SIMS (Maxis 2000) (allowing players to control an avatar, resembling a 
person of their own creation, with no finite objective; instead, the player is encouraged to control 
the avatar to make choices in an interactive environment). 
 50. Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 573. 
 51. Id. at 577–78 (“Self-defense, protection of others, dread of the ‘undead,’” fighting 
against overwhelming odds—these are all age-old themes of literature, and ones particularly 
appealing to the young. . . . We are in the world of kids’ popular culture. But it is not lightly to be 
suppressed.”). 
 52. See infra discussion Part III.B.2. 
 53. Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 579–80. 
 54. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2736–38 (2011); Kendrick, 244 
F.3d at 579–80. 
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D.  Out of “Crysis”: Expanding First Amendment  
Protections for Video Games (Late 2000s) 
By the late 2000s, video game technology had reached a new 
level of sophistication. Massively multiplayer online role-playing 
games
55
 became a dominant genre during the mid to late 2000s.
56
 
Voice over internet protocols let players verbally communicate in 
real time with other players.
57
 Players assumed the unique attributes 
of the characters that they controlled, and they spoke in the 
languages of their characters.
58
 The rise of this fully immersive, 
socialized community influenced the next decade of court decisions. 
Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc.
59
 arose out of a tragedy in which 
a teenager killed his friend with a kitchen knife.
60
 The mother of the 
deceased young man claimed that the killer was so addicted to the 
video game Mortal Kombat
61
 that he believed that he was a character 
in the game.
62
 Citing Kendrick and distinguishing Showplace, a 
federal court in Connecticut concluded that video games “that are 
analytically indistinguishable from other protected media, such as 
motion pictures or books, which convey information or evoke 
emotions by imagery, are protected under the First Amendment.”
63
 
The court highlighted Kendrick’s requirement that examinations of 
games be performed on a case-by-case basis.
64
 
Conversely, some courts used a more categorical approach. For 
example, in Sanders v. Acclaim Entertainment, Inc.,
65
 a case 
involving the victims of the tragic 1999 shooting at Columbine High 
School, a federal court in Colorado supported the Seventh Circuit’s 
 
 55. What Is an MMORPG?, THEGAMEGURU, http://thegameguru.me/games-ive-played/ 
what-is-an-mmorpg/ (last visited Feb. 29, 2012). 
 56. Brian D. Ng & Peter Wiemer-Hastings, Addiction to the Internet and Online Gaming, 8 
CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV., no. 2, 2005, at 110–13. 
 57. Laura Milligan, 17 Ways VoIP Has Improved My Gaming Experience, VOIP NEWS 
(Jan. 30, 2008), http://www.voip-news.com/feature/17-ways-voip-improves-gaming-013008/. 
 58. ANDREW ROLLINGS & ERNEST ADAMS, ANDREW ROLLINGS AND ERNEST ADAMS ON 
GAME DESIGN 347 (2003). 
 59. 198 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D. Conn. 2002). 
 60. Id. at 169. 
 61. MORTAL KOMBAT (Midway Games 1992). 
 62. Wilson, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 170. 
 63. Id. at 180–81. (citing Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th 
Cir. 2001)). 
 64. Id. at 181. 
 65. 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Colo. 2002). 
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conclusion in Kendrick but held that video games are a type of 
expression that may receive First Amendment protection.
66
 
The Connecticut and Colorado decisions highlighted courts’ 
inconsistent articulations of the constitutional standards for video 
games. Thus, the Supreme Court finally acted to remedy nearly four 
decades of confusion when it heard a case from California. 
III.  BROWN V. ENTERTAINMENT  
MERCHANTS ASS’N 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Brown arrived after the 
aforementioned winding legal and technological history and at the 
end of a more immediate legislative and judicial path. Thus, this Part 
first recounts the actions of the California legislature and the lower 
federal courts before it discusses the Supreme Court’s decision. 
A.  “Terminated”: AB 1179, the District Court’s  
Holding, and the Ninth Circuit’s Opinion 
Brown began when, to counteract increasing public complaints 
and legislative attempts to regulate the video game industry, the 
Entertainment Software Association (ESA) instituted a voluntary, 
self-regulated body that classifies a particular game’s content on a 
scale from “Early Childhood” to “Adults Only.”
67
 The body, the 
Entertainment Software Rating Board (ESRB), consults with a wide 
range of child development and academic experts to create a parent-
informed ratings system that allows consumers to make educated 
decisions when they select video games.
68
 
But California State Senator Leland Yee, who earned a Ph.D. in 
child psychology, was not convinced of the ESRB’s voluntary 
program’s effectiveness and argued that the government should 
restrict violent video game sales.
69
 The spark that he needed came on 
June 9, 2005, when the ESRB changed the rating of the popular 
 
 66. Id. at 1279. 
 67. Frequently Asked Questions, ENTM’T SOFTWARE RATING BD., http://www.esrb.org/ 
ratings/faq.jsp#1 (last visited July 25, 2011). 
 68. Mike Snider, Game Industry Put Focus on Ratings Years Ago, USA TODAY (June 28, 
2011, 8:25 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/gaming/2011-06-28-video-game-ratings_n.htm. 
 69. Ben Fritz, Lawmaker Defends Law Banning Sale of Violent Video Games to Minors, 
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2010, at B3. 
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game Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas
70
 from “Mature” to “Adults 
Only” because of the game’s explicit sexual content, thus causing 
retailers to return the game to its developer.
71
 Certain that state 
regulation was necessary, Senator Yee said that “playing violent 
games leads to increased physiological arousal, increased aggressive 
thoughts, increased aggressive feelings, increased aggressive 
behaviors, and decreased pro-social or helping behaviors.”
72
 
Subsequently, the California legislature passed a bill that 
Senator Yee had sponsored: California Assembly Bill (AB) 1179 
(the “Act”),
73
 which banned the sale of violent video games to 
minors and required stricter labels than those in the ESRB’s ratings 
system are.
74
 The ESA and the Video Software Dealers Association 
(VSDA)—now known as the Entertainment Merchants Association 
(EMA)—feared that the law would restrict the sale of titles that the 
ESRB otherwise labeled as appropriate for younger players.
75
 
Almost immediately,
76
 the VSDA filed suit in federal district 
court against various state officials (the “Defendants”), requesting an 
injunction based on the ground that the Act was facially 
unconstitutional.
77
 The Defendants argued that a court should 
analyze the Act under Ginsberg v. New York
78
—the 1968 case in 
which the Supreme Court found that a New York law that restricted 
the sale of any sexually explicit picture to a minor was well within 
the state’s power to protect minors, even though such a restriction of 
sales to adults would have been invalid
79
—and uphold the law.
80
 But 
 
 70. GRAND THEFT AUTO: SAN ANDREAS (Rockstar North 2005). 
 71. Jane Pinckard, ESRB Revokes “M” Rating for GTA, 1UP.COM (July 20, 2005), 
http://www.1up.com/news/esrb-revokes-rating-gta. 
 72. Bill Analysis AB 1179, 2005 S., Reg. Sess., at 6 (Cal. 2005) (statements by Sen. Leland 
Yee). 
 73. AB 1179, 2005 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005) (codified as CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(d) (West 
2009)). 
 74. CIV. § 1746(d), invalidated by Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 75. See Gene Hoffman, How the Wrong Decision in Schwarzenegger v. EMA Could Cripple 
Video Game Innovation, XCONOMY (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.xconomy.com/san-francisco/ 
2010/09/27/how-the-wrong-decision-in-schwarzenegger-v-ema-could-cripple-video-game-
innovation/. 
 76. Complaint at 1, Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034 
(N.D. Cal. 2005) (No. 05-4188). 
 77. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1039. 
 78. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
 79. Id. at 637, 639–40. 
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the district court was unwilling to accept the analogy to Ginsberg 
because “[n]either the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has ever 
extended the Ginsberg analysis beyond sexually-obscene material,” 
and it granted the injunction.
81
 The Ninth Circuit affirmed after 
subjecting the statute to strict scrutiny and holding it to be 
presumptively invalid as a content-based restriction on speech.
82
 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Opinion:  
A “Call of Duty” 
In a case that produced a majority opinion, a concurrence, and 
two dissents, Brown saw the Justices in allegiance on one important 
issue: as a distinctive form of expressive conduct, video games, they 
agreed, fall within the ambit of the First Amendment.
83
 From there, 
however, the differently reasoned opinions evinced a more divided 
Court than the 7–2 outcome suggests.
84
 
1.  The Majority Opinion:  
Protecting a New Form of Media 
In Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, the Court unequivocally 
held that video games qualify for First Amendment protection.
85
 Like 
books, plays, and movies, video games “communicate ideas—and 
even social messages—through many familiar literary devices (such 
as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features 
distinctive to the medium (such as the player’s interaction with the 
virtual world).”
86
 The majority reasoned that the basic principles of 
 
 80. Governor and Attorney General’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 1–2, 
Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (No. 05-4188). 
 81. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1045. 
 82. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 958 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based regulations are 
presumptively invalid.”)) (noting that strict scrutiny requires the demonstration (1) that the state 
has a compelling interest and (2) that the regulation is the least restrictive means for achieving 
that interest), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 83. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011). 
 84. Brown v. EMA: Too Good to Be True for Video Games?, LAW360 (Aug. 8, 2011,  
1:46 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/261385/brown-v-ema-too-good-to-be-true-for-video-
games-. 
 85. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733–42. 
 86. Id. at 2733. 
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the First Amendment “do not vary” with a new and different 
communication medium.
87
 
The majority, echoing Judge Posner’s argument in Kendrick, 
reminded the Defendants that the books American children read 
“contain no shortage of gore.”
88
 Indeed, in the classic tale of Hansel 
and Gretel, two children are taken captive by a witch who seeks to 
eat them.
89
 Hansel and Gretel escape by shoving the witch in an 
oven, leaving her to scream in pain while she “burned to ashes.”
90
 
Likewise, high-school reading lists contain epic tales that are filled 
with bloody encounters: Homer’s Odysseus blinds the Cyclops by 
grinding out his eye with a heated stake;
91
 in William Golding’s Lord 
of the Flies, a child named Piggy is savagely beaten by other 
children while they are marooned on an island.
92
 
The majority’s reliance on present-day video games’ literary and 
thematic devices appears to preclude the application of Brown to 
first-generation video games like PONG and thus did not necessarily 
abrogate Showplace, Caswell, and Marshfield. Rudimentary games 
like PONG do not have the immersive storyline that most current 
games possess, let alone a basic plot or setting.
93
 
The majority made this assertion clear by referring to Judge 
Posner’s discussion of interactive literature in Kendrick: “[T]he 
better it is, the more interactive. Literature when it is successful 
draws the reader into the story, makes him identify with the 
characters, invites him to judge them and quarrel with them, to 
experience their joys and sufferings as the reader’s own.”
94
 In 
PONG, the player controls a few movements of an unidentified 
 
 87. Id. (citing Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)). 
 88. Id. at 2736. 
 89. THE BROTHERS GRIMM, HANSEL AND GRETEL (1812). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2736 (citing HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 125 (S. Butcher & A. Lang 
trans.) (1909) (“Even so did we seize the fiery-pointed brand and whirled it round in his eye, and 
the blood flowed about the heated bar.”)). 
 92. Id. at 2737 (citing WILLIAM GOLDING, LORD OF THE FLIES 208–09 (1997)). 
 93. William K. Ford & Raizel Liebler, Games Are Not Coffee Mugs: Games and the Right of 
Publicity, in THE GAME BEHIND THE VIDEO GAME 113–14 (2011), available at 
http://cmcs.rutgers.edu/GBVG_Proceedings_v1.pdf. Indeed, the setting in PONG is a black and 
white, two-dimensional tennis court, and the objective is to simply win more points than your 
opponent. PONG, supra note 32. 
 94. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001). 
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character.
95
 Now, in Crysis 2, for example, the player assumes the 
role of a Force Recon Marine, codenamed “Alcatraz,” whose mission 
is to infiltrate a destroyed New York City that has been evacuated 
due to an alien infestation.
96
 The majority’s holding that California’s 
law was unconstitutional because even violent video games are 
entitled to First Amendment protection suggests that the 
technological progression—from the eight-bit, two-dimensional 
simulator in PONG to the dynamic, expressive medium in Crysis 2—
was on the Court’s mind. 
2.  The Concurring Opinion:  
Justice Alito’s Warning 
The gory and inhumane methods of killing that are present in 
some video games troubled the concurrence, which Justice Alito 
authored (and Chief Justice Roberts joined).
97
 Still, he sided with the 
EMA: “Although the California statute is well intentioned, its terms 
are not framed with the precision that the Constitution demands.”
98
 
Justice Alito was particularly concerned with the vague definition of 
“violent video games.”
99
 He wrote that the Act, while it adhered to 
the standards in Ginsberg, relied on “undefined societal or 
community standards.”
100
 On the other hand, in Ginsberg, “hard 
core” sexual depictions were considered “offensive representations” 
in the community.
101
 Thus, Justice Alito contrasted obscenity with 
violence: society “has long regarded many depictions of killing and 
maiming as suitable features of popular entertainment.”
102
 
But the most important aspect of Justice Alito’s opinion was his 
reference to technological advances in video game mechanics. 
Courts, after all, have struggled to understand rapidly evolving 
technology even while they have continued to take pride in careful 
 
 95. See supra text accompanying note 32. 
 96. A. Garner, Crysis 2 Review, VGAMERNEWS (Oct. 5, 2011), http://vgamernews.com/ 
articles/786/crysis-2-review/. 
 97. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2749 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 98. Id. at 2742. 
 99. Id. at 2743. 
 100. Id. at 2745. 
 101. Id. at 2744. 
 102. Id. at 2745. 
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examination and dispute resolution. Justice Alito recognized this 
dichotomy and cautioned future courts that will decide these issues: 
In considering the application of unchanging constitutional 
principles to new and rapidly evolving technology, this 
Court should proceed with caution. We should make every 
effort to understand the new technology. We should take 
into account the possibility that developing technology may 
have important societal implications that will become 
apparent only with time. We should not jump to the 
conclusion that new technology is fundamentally the same 
as some older thing with which we are familiar.
103
 
In the final sentence of his opinion, Justice Alito wrote, “If 
differently framed statutes are enacted by the States or by the Federal 
Government, we can consider the constitutionality of those laws 
when cases challenging them are presented to us[,]” thus leaving 
open the possibility that it may not be “game over” for all violent-
video-game legislation.
104
 But Alito did not point to a particular type 
of legislation that would have been appropriate, forcing legislators to 
speculate about how to properly draft a violent-video-game statute. 
3.  The Dissenting Opinions: 
 Protecting Children 
The dissenting opinions came in two distinct flavors: the first, 
written by Justice Thomas, was grounded in the argument that First 
Amendment rights are not extended to speech that is aimed at 
children;
105
 the second, written by Justice Breyer, maintained that the 
“power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond 
the scope of its authority over adults.”
106
 
Citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
107
 Justice Thomas 
reasoned that the First Amendment does not extend to all speech: 
“The practices and beliefs of the founding generation establish that 
 
 103. Id. at 2742. 
 104. Id. at 2751. 
 105. Id. at 2752 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 106. Id. at 2762 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 
(1944)). 
 107. 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (“There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of 
speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem.”); id. at 571–72. 
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‘the freedom of speech,’ as originally understood, does not include a 
right to speak to minors (or a right of minors to access speech) 
without going through the minors’ parents or guardians.”
108
 
Justice Thomas cited minimum-age labor laws, voting laws, military 
service, motor-vehicle laws, gambling laws, and jury duty as 
evidence of society’s age-based restrictions on minors.
109
 
Justice Thomas expounded on his assertion that the founders did 
not intend for children to have free access to speech: 
The historical evidence shows that the founding generation 
believed parents had absolute authority over their minor 
children and expected parents to use that authority to direct 
the proper development of their children. It would be absurd 
to suggest that such a society understood “the freedom of 
speech” to include a right to speak to minors (or a 
corresponding right of minors to access speech) without 
going through the minors’ parents.
110
 
In contrast, Justice Breyer’s opinion was emphatically broad: 
citing Prince v. Massachusetts
111
 and Ginsberg he reasoned that 
[t]his Court has held that the “power of the state to control 
the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its 
authority over adults.” And the “regulatio[n] of 
communication addressed to [children] need not conform to 
the requirements of the [F]irst [A]mendment in the same 
way as those applicable to adults.”
112
 
Like Justice Alito, Justice Breyer contended that the majority opinion 
was too dismissive of the potential harm that games can cause 
 
 108. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2751 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Interestingly enough, Justice 
Thomas, in another dissenting opinion, accepted the same view that the First Amendment does 
not protect minor speech. In Morse v. Frederick, a student held an “offensive” sign outside of his 
high school. 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007). There, Justice Thomas concluded that “the First 
Amendment, as originally understood, does not protect student speech in public schools.” Id. at 
410–11. If parents do not like it, “they can send their children to private schools or homeschool 
them; or they can simply move.” Id. at 420. See also Aaron Caplan, Visions of Public Education 
in Morse v. Frederick, J. EDUC. CONTROVERSY, Winter 2008 (discussing the educational 
philosophy of the Supreme Court in Morse). 
 109. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2760 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 110. Id. at 2752. 
 111. 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding that the government has broad authority to regulate the 
actions and the treatment of children; parental authority is not absolute). 
 112. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2762 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Ginsberg 
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 n.6 (1968); Prince, 321 U.S. at 170). 
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minors.
113
 Justice Breyer believed that where the majority found only 
correlation, he found causation in many of the scientific studies.
114
 
Justice Breyer also worried that the majority opinion “reduce[d] 
the industry’s incentive to police itself” by using the ESRB.
115
 
Breyer’s foremost concern was that the majority’s opinion modified 
Court precedent: 
[T]oday the Court makes clear that a State cannot prohibit 
the sale to minors of the most violent interactive video 
games. But what sense does it make to forbid selling to a 
13-year-old boy a magazine with an image of a nude 
woman, while protecting a sale to that 13-year-old of an 
interactive video game in which he actively, but virtually, 
binds and gags the woman, then tortures and kills her?
116
 
The four opinions, while they offered a diverse and unique 
perspective on the history of video game jurisprudence, collectively 
forecast the possibility that video games may not be protected by the 
First Amendment in the future. 
IV.  ANALYSIS: THE IMPACT OF  
BROWN V. ENTERTAINMENT  
MERCHANTS ASS’N 
After the decision, Senator Yee, who initiated the eight-year 
litigation in Brown, harshly disapproved of the Court’s holding, 
claiming that “[i]t is simply wrong that the video game industry can 
be allowed to put their profit margins over the rights of parents and 
the well-being of children.”
117
 He planned to review the dissents in 
Brown “in hope of finding a way to reintroduce the law in a way it 
 
 113. Id. at 2762–63. 
 114. Id. at 2768 (“Longitudinal studies, which measure changes over time, have found that 
increased exposure to violent video games causes an increase in aggression over the same 
period.”). 
 115. Id. at 2770. 
 116. Id. at 2771. 
 117. Brett Molina, Author of Violent Video Games Law Blasts Supreme Court Decision, 
GAMEHUNTERS (June 27, 2011, 2:39 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/game 
hunters/post/2011/06/author-of-violent-video-games-law-blasts-supreme-court-decision/1; U.S. 
Supreme Court Puts Corporate Interests Before Protecting Kids, SENATOR LELAND YEE, PH.D. 
(June 27, 2011), http://dist08.casen.govoffice.com/index.asp?Type=B_PR&SEC={EFA496BC-
EDC8-4E38-9CC7-68D37AC03DFF}&DE={25F3EB3A-3F71-4121-9107-1D6B06F65872}. 
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would be constitutional.”
118
 Indeed, the question now is whether 
California, or any state for that matter, can ever draft a violent-video-
game law that would satisfy the Court. 
A.  The Legal Effects of the Decision 
and Predictions of the Future 
In the wake of Brown, it is safe to assume that video games will 
not be classified among the unprotected categories of speech (such as 
obscenity, fighting words, or incitement).
119
 Also, after the decision, 
courts are likely to hold that the First Amendment protects 
expression that is directed at children (despite Justice Thomas’s 
disagreement).
120
 However, categorical protection under the First 
Amendment is not the end of the inquiry. The five majority Justices 
found that the Act failed the test for strict scrutiny because of the 
conflicting studies regarding harmful effects, the over- and under-
inclusiveness of the statute, and the less-restrictive alternative that 
the industry’s voluntary rating system offered.
121
 Yet Alito’s warning 
that the Court should proceed with caution when it applies rigid 
constitutional principles to rapidly evolving technology is a reminder 
of the Court’s tendency to reverse its decisions following a change in 
society with the passage of time.
122
 
Indeed, the 2010s are beginning to usher in a new era, called the 
“eighth generation,” of technological advancements in video gaming: 
 
 118. Chris Pereira, Senator Yee Hopes to Reintroduce Videogame Violence Law, 1UP 
(June 27, 2011), http://www.1up.com/news/senator-yee-hopes-reintroduce-videogame-violence-
law. 
 119. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 
(1969); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
 120. Brown v. EMA: Too Good to Be True for Video Games?, supra note 84. 
 121. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 122. See Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, 
and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483 (2007) (quantitatively researching the ideological 
shifts of Supreme Court Justices over time). Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) 
(overruling Bowers and finding a constitutional protection of sexual privacy), with Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that state sodomy laws were constitutional); compare 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (questioning the right of a woman 
to terminate her pregnancy in the “early stages”), with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
(establishing a right of privacy that extends to a woman’s right to choose whether to abort her 
child); compare Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy and finding racial 
segregation in schools unconstitutional), with Plessy v. Fergusson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) 
(upholding the constitutionality of state laws requiring racial segregation). 
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gaming without controllers,
123
 glasses-free 3-D,
124
 and virtual 
reality.
125
 If virtual reality, three-dimensional space, and infrared 
movement simulators are used instead of joysticks and buttons, the 
Court may have to reexamine its reasoning in Brown in the future. 
Surely, Homer’s Cyclops and Golding’s Piggy do not actually come 
to life on the page; they, like characters in all written works, are 
visually constructed using the imagination of the human brain. But 
with virtual reality and an increasingly developed artificial 
intelligence, users will see, in three dimensions, the corpses of the 
people they kill in the games they play.
126
 Users will smell the odors 
of the battlefield and hear the screams of their victims in pristine 
quality.
127
 Users will move the instruments of war through remote 
muscle sensors, using their hands as killing machines instead of 
simply mashing buttons on a controller.
128
 This is not the backdrop 
that the majority had when it made its decision. But it may have been 
the backdrop for Justice Alito, who seemed astutely aware that in the 
future video game technology may merge fantasy with reality.
129
 
On the other hand, it is possible that Alito’s warning sounds a 
premature alarm. In 1994, the world was introduced to the so-called 
first-person shooter game with Doom,
130
 and it was shocked by the 
game’s gore, satanic imagery, and blood.
131
 But by the late 2000s, 
 
 123. Some consoles have motion sensing input devices that allow users to control and interact 
with the video game by using only gestures or spoken commands. See Xbox Unveils 
Entertainment Experiences That Put Everyone Center Stage, MICROSOFT NEWS CENTER (June 1, 
2009), http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2009/jun09/06-01e3pr.mspx. 
 124. Glasses-free 3-D, or more accurately “autostereoscopy,” is a method of displaying 
stereoscopic vision (binocular perception with 3-D depth) without the use of special glasses. See 
2 Dr. Nick Holliman, 3D Display Systems, in HANDBOOK OF OPTOELECTRONICS (John P. Dakin 
& Robert G. W. Brown eds., Taylor & Francis 2006), available at http://www.dur.ac.uk/ 
n.s.holliman/Presentations/3dv3-0.pdf. 
 125. David Derbyshire, Revealed: The Headset That Will Mimic All Five Senses and Make 
the Virtual World as Convincing as Real Life, DAILY MAIL (Mar. 5, 2009), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1159206/The-headset-mimic-senses-make-virtual-
world-convincing-real-life.html. 
 126. See id. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See Jeremy Hsu, The Future of Video Game Input: Muscle Sensors, LIVE SCI. (Oct. 28, 
2009), http://www.livescience.com/5836-future-video-game-input-muscle-sensors.html. 
 129. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011). 
 130. DOOM (id Software 1994). 
 131. Winda Benedetti, From “Doom” to “Rage,” First-Person Shooters Grow Up, MSNBC 
(Oct. 5, 2011), http://ingame.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/10/05/8163502-from-doom-to-rage-
first-person-shooters-grow-up. 
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Battlefield: Bad Company 2,
132
 Call of Duty: Black Ops,
133
 and Left 
4 Dead 2
134
 made Doom’s “violence” look like the cartoonish 
violence of Super Mario Bros.
135
 “When you look at it now it’s 
almost kind of silly,” remarked Tim Willits, the creator of Doom, 
during a 2011 interview.
136
 Just as the controversy of Death Race in 
1976 faded and the shock that Doom created in 1994 is now largely 
forgotten, the passage of time may eventually desensitize society to 
technology’s new representations of violence in video gaming. 
Justice Alito’s warning can be juxtaposed with the dicta in 
Showplace
137
: one sounded the trumpet for the charge of video 
games into the protected speech arena, and the other ominously 
predicted their eventual demise. Thus, video games, as they are 
presently created, are protected, but video games that are either too 
primitive or too “advanced” may ultimately not be protected. 
B.  The “Vehicle” of First Amendment 
 Protection for Video Games 
Because video game technology (animation and programming) 
and the ways in which video game technology is used to enhance the 
game-play mechanic (use of a joystick, motion-sensitive pad, or 
infrared control) have evolved over time, courts’ views regarding 
certain types of restrictions on video games have changed from 
critical to accepting and may eventually return to critical.
138
 Along 
the way, thematic questions have developed
139
: whether historical 
restrictions on rudimentary video games are not abrogated following 
Brown; whether a video game’s animation and programming are 
more or less instrumental in a court’s evaluation of the video game 
than human interaction with the video game is; and whether the 
 
 132. BATTLEFIELD: BAD COMPANY 2 (Electronic Arts 2010). 
 133. CALL OF DUTY: BLACK OPS (Treyarch 2010). 
 134. LEFT 4 DEAD 2 (Valve 2009). 
 135. SUPER MARIO BROS. (Nintendo 1985). 
 136. Benedetti, supra note 131. 
 137. See supra text accompanying notes 102–104. 
 138. Compare Am.’s Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 170 
(E.D.N.Y. 1982) (concluding that early video games were incapable of expression and not 
protected under the First Amendment), with Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 
(2011) (holding that modern video games were capable of sufficient expression to be protected 
under the First Amendment). 
 139. See supra Parts II, III. 
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video game is a continuous system of technology—only changing in 
its attributes over time—or whether the video game is a “vehicle” 
whose basic elements are unrelated to each class of vehicle. 
For instance, if, after Brown, a court were more inclined to 
accept a video game because of the elements of human interaction, 
PONG may well be protected speech whereas Grand Theft Auto 
might not. In PONG, a two-dimensional table tennis simulator, the 
player stood at a video-arcade machine and used a knob to compete 
against another human or computer opponent.
140
 In Grand Theft 
Auto, on the other hand, the player plays on a console system within 
the privacy of his own home and does not engage with any other 
human players. Then again, if a court were to conclude that protected 
speech is a matter of detail in the game’s visual effects, Grand Theft 
Auto would certainly come under the First Amendment. 
Moreover, if the video game is more like a car, then Death Race 
and PONG are the equivalent of Ford’s Model T, and Crysis
141
 and 
World of Warcraft
142
 are the equivalent of a 2011 Honda Civic. Each 
is still within the same class, but the attributes of the system have 
been enhanced (faster performance and enhanced graphics). 
Conversely, if the video game is more like a class of vehicle like a 
boat, train, plane, or car, not only are the attributes within the 
particular class changing over time but so are the attributes outside of 
the class. Sam Lake, a writer of the Max Payne series of video 
games, has addressed this very point: video games contribute 
attributes of several forms of media—visual effects; music and sound 
effects; human kinesthetic motion; and elements of a story, including 
plot, setting, conflict, and resolution.
143
 
Thus, where the game is played, the caliber of detail that is used 
to enhance play, the type of human motion that is needed to play the 
game, and the emotions or thoughts that the player experiences 
during play are all elements that courts should consider when they 
evaluate whether video games constitute expressive conduct that 
merits First Amendment protection. 
 
 140. See supra text accompanying note 32. 
 141. CRYSIS (Crytek 2007). 
 142. WORLD OF WARCRAFT (Blizzard 2004). 
 143. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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C.  Brown: A Late Decision? 
Yet, while Brown was a significant victory for the gaming 
industry, the decision came somewhat late. Since Kendrick, there has 
been a fairly broad consensus that the First Amendment protects 
electronic games.
144
 In many ways, Brown is similar to Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
145
 the 1952 case that established motion 
pictures as a protected medium; it was cited by both the storeowner 
in Showplace and the Court in Brown. The Burstyn Court protected 
movies only after the medium was widely accepted in popular 
culture.
146
 Similarly, the Court in Brown protected video games only 
after their nearly forty-year history in the public’s eye.
147
 Ultimately, 
this largely defeats the antimajoritarian goals of the First 
Amendment.
148
 
Until the Supreme Court clearly defines “speech,” different 
forms of new media will only receive First Amendment after they 
have won popular acceptance, just as film did in the 1950s and video 
games did a half-century later. In the majority opinion, Scalia wrote: 
“Justice Alito’s argument highlights the precise danger posed by the 
California Act: that the ideas expressed by speech—whether it be 
violence, or gore, or racism—and not its objective effects, may be 
the real reason for governmental proscription.”
149
 The current legal 
landscape defines speech only by its prejudices and opinions, rather 
than by its objective capabilities; new media will continually be 
susceptible to legal constraint for as long as that is the case. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The “vehicle” of video games has progressed along two fronts 
during its nearly forty years of existence. First, the graphical 
representations of video games have become more visually 
appealing, sharper, and more defined. Second, the development of a 
story within the game has captivated players who want to experience 
 
 144. See supra text accompanying notes 24–26. 
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 146. Id. at 501–02. 
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gamerevolution/history/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2011); see supra text accompanying notes 85–87. 
 148. Rousse, supra note 29, at 225. 
 149. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011). 
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and share those experiences with other players. The video games of 
yesterday are nearly unrecognizable from the video games of today. 
Video games changed from being played in a public entertainment 
center to being played in the privacy of the home; from simple 
controls and primitive graphics to persistent universes and three-
dimensional characters; from joysticks and knobs to infrared remotes 
that sync with the player’s movements; and from pure entertainment 
to immersive voice interaction and imaginative role-playing. With 
Brown, the law finally caught up to the technology. Just as society 
has developed different regulations for different vehicles—needing a 
driver’s license to drive a car, needing a pilot’s license to fly a 
plane—the courts, too, have developed different regulations for 
different classes of video games. The decisions of Showplace, 
Caswell, and Marshfield are still valid on the theory that the video 
games that were at issue in those cases involved “technologically 
advanced pinball machines,” a far cry from the plot-driven, 
community-based video games of today. 
Over forty years, the “technologically advanced pinball 
machine” has become the persistent, visually astounding, audibly 
gratifying entertainment option of millions. It is that entertainment 
option, through the emergence of technology and the creation of 
complex, satisfying storylines that the Court had as its backdrop in 
Brown. It still remains to be seen what effect Justice Alito’s warning 
that the Court should proceed with caution when it applies rigid 
constitutional principles to rapidly evolving technology will have on 
the future of video games. Will the technological progress of video 
games cause their own demise, once fantasy is merged seamlessly 
with reality? While the question lingers, for now video games enjoy 
the same constitutional protection that all other media that came 
before them enjoy. 
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